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Abstract: California recently overhauled its K–12 public education finance system. 
Enacted in 2013, the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) replaced California’s 40 -
year-old funding formula. The LCFF increases district officials’ fiscal flexibility; provides 
more resources to districts serving larger proportions of low-income, English learner (EL), 
and foster youth students; and requires district officials to engage community members in 
district decisions. This article expands on a study conducted by a team of 12 independent 
researchers that investigated the early implementation of the LCFF. The study sought to 
answer three research questions: (a) how are district officials using their newfound budget 
flexibility? (b) how are district officials engaging parents and other stakeholders? (c) what 
are the opportunities provided to districts under the LCFF and the challenges it creates for 
them? Data include 71 semi-structured interviews with district stakeholders across 10 
diverse districts in California and 22 interviews with county office of education (COE) 
officials across the state. Findings include that respondents were cautiously optimistic  
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about the LCFF. District officials appreciated increased budget flexibility and the focus on 
community engagement. Inevitably, however, district and COE officials experienced 
challenges in implementing the law during its first year.  
Keywords: Local control funding formula; LCFF; local control accountability plan; 
California; school finance; equity; adequacy; fiscal flexibility; local control; community 
engagement; state reform 
Un análisis preliminar de la fórmula de control del nuevo sistema de financiamiento local de 
California 
Resumen: El estado de California revisó recientemente su sistema de financiamiento de la 
educación pública básica (K-12). Promulgada en 2013, la fórmula de control local del Financiamiento 
(LCFF por su sigla en inglés) sustituyó la anterior fórmula, vigente por 40 años. El LCFF aumenta la 
flexibilidad fiscal del distrito; proporciona más recursos a los distritos que sirven una mayor 
proporción de personas de bajos ingresos, que usan el inglés como segunda lengua (ELL), 
estudiantes jóvenes; y requiere que los funcionarios del distrito involucren a los miembros de la 
comunidad en las decisiones del distrito. Este artículo expande un estudio llevado a cabo por un 
equipo de 12 investigadores independientes que investigó la aplicación de la LCFF. El estudio 
responde a tres preguntas de investigación: (a) ¿cómo utilizan los funcionarios del distrito la nueva 
flexibilidad presupuestaria? (b) ¿cómo hacen los funcionarios del distrito para involucrar a padres y 
otras partes interesadas? (c) ¿Cuáles son las oportunidades y desafíos que brinda a los distritos la 
LCFF? Los datos incluyen 71 entrevistas semi-estructuradas con responsables del distrito en 10 
distritos de California y 22 entrevistas con funcionarios de la oficina de educación del condado 
(COE) en todo el estado. Los resultados señalan que los encuestados se mostraron cautelosamente 
optimistas sobre LCFF. Las autoridades del distrito aprecian una mayor flexibilidad presupuestaria y 
el enfoque en la participación de la comunidad. Sin embargo, los funcionarios del distrito y del COE 
experimentaron dificultades en la aplicación de la ley durante su primer año. 
Palabras clave: fórmula de financiación de control local; responsabilidad local; California; 
financiamiento educativo; equidad; adecuación; flexibilidad fiscal; control local; participación de la 
comunidad; reforma del estado 
 
Uma análise preliminar da fórmula do novo sistema de financiamento local California 
controle 
Resumo: O estado da Califórnia modifico recentemente o seu sistema de financiamento da 
educação pública básica (K-12). Promulgada em 2013, a fórmula para o controle local do 
Financiamento (LCFF por sua sigla em Inglês) substituiu a fórmula anterior, válida por 40 anos. A 
LCFF aumenta a flexibilidade fiscal dos distritos; fornece mais recursos para os distritos que servem 
uma maior proporção de pessoas de baixa renda, que usam o Inglês como segunda língua (ELL), 
estudantes jovens; e requer oficiais do distrito que envolvem membros da comunidade nas decisões 
do distrito. Este artigo expande um estudo realizado por uma equipe de 12 pesquisadores 
independentes que investigaram a aplicação de LCFF. O estudo aborda as questões três pesquisas: 
(a) como usaram os representantes do distrito a nova flexibilidade orçamental? (b) Como 
envolveram as autoridades distritais os pais e outras grupos? (c) Quais são as oportunidades e 
desafios oferecidos aos distritos pela LCFF? Os dados incluem 71 entrevistas semi-estruturadas com 
autoridades do distrito em 10 distritos na Califórnia e 22 entrevistas com funcionários do conselho 
de Educação do estado (COE). Os resultados indicam que os entrevistados estavam cautelosamente 
otimistas sobre LCFF. Funcionários distritais apreciaram uma maior flexibilidade orçamental e o 
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envolvimento da comunidade. No entanto, funcionários do distrito e do COE teveram dificuldades 
na aplicação da lei durante seu primeiro ano. 
Palavras-chave: fórmula de financiamento para o controle local; responsabilidade local; 
Califórnia; financiamento da educação; equidade; adequação; flexibilidade fiscal; controle l ocal; 
participação da comunidade; reforma do estado 
Introduction 
On July 1, 2013, California overhauled its K–12 public education finance system. Governor 
Jerry Brown signed the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) into law, which replaced 
California’s 40-year-old funding formula (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2013). True to 
its name, the LCFF increases local control by giving district officials more flexibility in deciding how 
to allocate state dollars. The LCFF also changes the formula that the state uses to allocate funds to 
districts: Funding is based on average daily attendance as well as unduplicated counts and 
concentrations of targeted student subgroups—specifically, low-income, English learner (EL), and 
foster youth students (Taylor, 2013). The LCFF’s premise is to provide more resources to districts 
that serve targeted students and, at the same time, grant district officials more flexibility in deciding 
how to allocate state funds to best meet local needs and improve student outcomes (Office of 
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2013). 
The LCFF provides district officials with increased fiscal flexibility because it eliminates 
approximately three fourths of prior state categorical, or restricted, programs—or 48% of total state 
categorical aid1—and redirects these funds to districts as general purpose, or unrestricted, funds 
(Taylor, 2013). For the average district in California, over 60% of district funding comes from the 
state, and under the previous system, the state earmarked approximately one third of state funds for 
specific programs—such as arts and music, professional development, or class size reduction—or 
for specific students—such as students with disabilities or students from low-income backgrounds 
(Education Data Partnership, 2012); thus, district officials were restricted in deciding how to allocate 
a substantial portion of their state funds.2  
The LCFF grants district officials increased fiscal flexibility and simultaneously requires 
district officials to garner stakeholder input on various decisions—particularly regarding resource 
allocation and goal setting—and to align district goals with the state’s eight priority areas: basic 
services, course access, implementation of state standards, parent involvement, pupil achievement, 
pupil engagement, school climate, and other pupil outcomes (Affeldt, 2015). To document how 
district officials engaged with their local communities, developed district goals, and allocated 
                                                 
1 To calculate the proportion of state categorical aid that was eliminated, we used a combination of 2012–13 
budget tables from the California Department of Education (2014a), and lists of categorical programs 
maintained and eliminated under the LCFF from various sources (California Department of Education, 
2014b; California Department of Education, 2015; Taylor, 2013). We calculated the proportion by summing 
the dollar allocations for the eliminated categorical programs and dividing this sum by the total dollar 
allocation for all state categorical programs in the 2012-13 year; we did not include one-time categorical funds 
in this calculation. For categorical programs for which we were uncertain whether the program was 
maintained or eliminated under the LCFF, we emailed the California Department of Education and received a 
response. We calculated that 48% of state categorical funding became unrestricted under the LCFF. Special 
education accounted for 26% of the state categorical funding. Therefore, 26% of non-special education state 
categorical funding was maintained under the LCFF. 
2 The proportion of state funds that was restricted varied across districts from an insignificant proportion to 
more than one third of a district’s budget (Education Data Partnership, 2012).  
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resources, the state requires district officials to create and adopt a publicly available accountability 
document—a Local Control Accountability Plan (LCAP)—with community input (Taylor, 2013). In 
addition, the state assigned the responsibility of reviewing and approving districts’ LCAPs to the 
county offices of education (COEs), creating a new oversight role for COEs (Taylor, 2013). 
Governor Brown ushered the LCFF through the California legislature, and it was passed 
with bipartisan legislative support (Beltran, 2014). Governor Brown believed in the principle of 
subsidiarity, or that education could be more effectively managed at the district—rather than state—
level, and that it was impossible for the state to micromanage education across all districts in 
California, given the large differences in local needs (Brown, 2013; Brown, 2014). Thus, the LCFF is 
designed to shift responsibility for education from the state to the district level (Brown, 2014). 
To the authors’ knowledge, no other state, particularly one as large as California, has enacted a 
similar reform, although components of other states’ education finance reforms are analogous to 
provisions of the LCFF. For example, in its 2012 Bridge to Excellence Act, Maryland simplified its 
funding formula by reducing the number of categorical grant programs and allocated additional 
resources to districts with larger proportions of low-income and EL students; however, resources 
allocated to districts on the basis of the proportion of low-income students and EL students had to 
be spent on those student populations and were not unrestricted funds as they are under the LCFF 
(Scafidi, 2008). In 2007, the state of New York allocated additional Contracts for Excellence Funds 
to low-performing districts, but these funds could be distributed only to certain schools and had to 
be spent on students with the greatest education needs and in specific program areas (New York 
State Education Management Services, 2013). The LCFF is unique in that it grants district officials 
substantially more fiscal flexibility. 
Understanding that the LCFF is still a work in progress, this paper reports findings from a 
study of the early implementation of the LCFF in California. The study sought to answer three 
research questions: (a) How are district officials using their newfound budget flexibility? (b) How are 
district officials engaging parents and other stakeholders? (c) What are the opportunities provided to 
districts under the LCFF and the challenges it creates for them?  Findings were initially presented in 
Toward a Grand Vision: Early Implementation of California’s Local Control Funding Formula by Daniel 
Humphrey and Julia Koppich (2014).3  
The purpose of this paper is to explain the LCFF and to report on its early implementation. We first 
provide a brief overview of school finance in California and explain the provisions of the LCFF. 
Next, we discuss the literature that informs how districts and schools have used increased fiscal 
flexibility and engaged their local communities under past reforms. We proceed to describe the data 
collected and methods used by the study team. We then expand upon the findings initially published 
in the report by Humphrey and Koppich (2014) by including additional data and findings. Finally, 
we provide implications of the LCFF and highlight areas for future research.  
A Brief Overview of School Finance in California 
Equity, efficiency, and adequacy are the three primary concerns of school finance (Odden & 
Picus, 2008; Rice, Monk, & Zhang, 2010), and California’s previous school finance formula was 
                                                 
3 Data were collected by a team of 12 independent researchers, and we were members of the study team. The 
major findings were identified by the study team, and the findings were initially presented in Humphrey and 
Koppich’s (2014) report available at the following websites: 
http://www.stuartfoundation.org/docs/reports/toward-a-grand-vision--early-implementation-of-ca%27s-
lcff.pdf?sfvrsn=2 and http://www.sri.com/work/publications/toward-grand-vision-early-implementation-
californias-local-control-funding-formula. 
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heavily criticized for being inequitable and inefficient and for providing districts with inadequate 
funding (Loeb, Bryk, & Hanushek, 2008; Timar & Roza, 2010). Efficiency in allocating resources 
involves maximizing student outcomes given a set of inputs (Stiefel, Schwartz, Rubenstein, & Zabel, 
2005) or using the least costly combination of resources to produce a certain student outcome (Rice 
et al., 2010). Equity concerns fairness in educational services and goods (Rice, 2004) and is measured 
in two ways: Horizontal equity exists if students with similar characteristics receive the same amount 
of resources, and vertical equity is achieved if students with greater educational needs receive 
sufficient additional resources (Berne & Stiefel, 1984). Adequacy concerns providing resources and 
services that are sufficient “to provide all students an equal opportunity to learn to high 
performance standards” (Odden & Picus, 2008, p. 75). 
Over the last 10 years, districts in California received approximately 10% of their funding 
from the federal government, 61% from the state, and 29% from local revenues, on average 
(Education Data Partnership, 2012). Prior to 1979, however, the majority of district funding came 
from local sources (Bersin, Kirst, & Liu 2008). The state courts, legislature, and voters are 
responsible for multiple laws that influenced the education finance system in California.  
Since the 1960s, state funding for public education in California has been allocated to 
districts in two forms: as unrestricted funds for general education purposes and as categorical, or 
restricted, funds for specific purposes (Weston, 2011). In 1971, the California Supreme Court ruled 
that the then-existing funding formula was unconstitutional because it resulted in a wide disparity in 
per-pupil expenditures for general education purposes across districts (Education Data Partnership, 
2012; Weston, 2011). The Court required the state to equalize per-pupil expenditures for general 
education purposes for districts of the same type (e.g., elementary, high school, or unified) and size 
in terms of student enrollment (Weston, 2011). In response, the California legislature in 1972 limited 
how much districts could spend per pupil for general education purposes; the amount that districts 
could spend per pupil for general education purposes became known as the “per-pupil revenue 
limit” (Education Data Partnership, 2012, p. 1). Bersin et al. (2008) contend that revenue limits are 
still the most important component of the California education finance system. One problem with 
revenue limits, as Kirst (2006) explained, is that revenue limits place the focus on equalizing 
resources across districts without regard for how much money is needed to provide students with an 
adequate education or for differences in costs across districts. The equalization approach does not 
account for vertical equity or in other words, differences in students’ needs across districts.   
Then, in 1978 in response to increasing property taxes, voters passed Proposition 13, which 
“create[d] a uniform statewide property tax of 1%” and limits increases in property taxes to 2% per 
year (Weston, 2013, p. 1). The passage of Proposition 13 led to a 50% reduction in local revenues 
for public education (Bersin et al., 2008), and as a result, most districts began to rely heavily on state 
aid to fund public education (Kirst, 2006; Loeb et al., 2008). As a result, California’s education 
finance system became one of the most centralized systems in the country (Kirst, 2006). While other 
states implemented similar laws to Proposition 13, other states did not also enforce per-pupil 
revenue limits; the combination of per-pupil revenue limits and Proposition 13 substantially 
hindered districts’ abilities to raise money for public education locally (Kirst, 2006).  
Around 3% of districts exceed the per-pupil revenue limit with local revenues and thus do 
not receive state aid for general education purposes, although these districts may still receive state 
categorical aid (Education Data Partnership, 2012; Kirst, 2006); these districts are referred to as 
basic aid or excess revenue districts (Education Data Partnership, 2012; Taylor, 2013; Weston, 
2013). Basic aid districts typically have high per-pupil expenditures, serve low proportions of 
targeted students compared with other districts in the state, and are mostly located in northern 
California (Kirst, 2006; Weston, 2013). 
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Given the loss in local funds for public education and out of concern for the insufficient 
funding for public education, voters passed Proposition 98 in 1988 (Bersin et al., 2008). Proposition 
98 guarantees that the state will allocate a certain proportion of its revenues for public K–12 and 
community college education (Kirst, 2006). However, funding for public education is negatively 
affected by downturns in the state economy and is “vulnerable to the state’s volatile sales and 
income tax receipts” (Bersin et al., 2008, p. 2; Kirst, 2006). In other words, future funding for public 
education is uncertain because it depends on the success of California’s economy (Loeb et al., 2008).  
Voters also prevented $5.6 billion of budget cuts to public education in 2012 by passing 
Proposition 30, which increased the state’s sales tax and the income tax for households with annual 
earnings of more than $250,000 (California Budget Project, 2012).4 Still, per-pupil spending for 
public education in California lagged that in the majority of states, even when adjusting for 
geographic cost differences (Loeb et al., 2008). Adjusting for teacher salary differences across states, 
California spent 30% less per pupil than the average state, resulting in larger class sizes and fewer 
staff members—including teachers and principals—per pupil than in other states (Loeb et al., 2008). 
Loeb et al. (2008) found these spending differences to be consequential because California was 
ranked the seventh lowest in eighth grade math achievement and the third lowest in eighth grade 
reading achievement compared with other states, and students in all racial and ethnic subgroups 
performed worse in California than in other states.  
Another important component of California’s education finance system is categorical 
funding. Prior to the LCFF, categorical funds comprised roughly one third of state funding for 
public education (Education Data Partnership, 2012). Categorical funds are restricted funds, and 
each categorical fund may only be used for a specific program or student group (Education Data 
Partnership, 2012). Thus, district officials cannot transfer funds from one categorical program to 
another or spend categorical funds for general education purposes (Bersin et al., 2008). State 
categorical funds do not count towards each district’s per-pupil revenue limits.  
Categorical funding began in the 1960s “as state legislators reacted to political pressure to 
address the needs of disadvantaged children and signaled their lack of confidence in local educators 
to do so successfully” (Bersin et al., p. 2). Categorical funding intensified in the 1970s and was 
maintained by politicians as “each new program create[d] a constituency intent on preserving it” 
(Bersin et al., p. 2). Categorical funding was also used by politicians as a mechanism for preventing 
increased state aid from being spent to increase teachers’ salaries (Kirst, 2006). The number of 
categorical funds increased dramatically over time. In 1993, 57 different categorical programs were 
identified, but due to lack of accessible documentation, it was difficult to determine the exact 
number and purposes of the categorical programs (Timar, 2006). In 2004, 223 state and federal 
categorical programs were documented, and multiple categorical programs were designed to achieve 
the same purpose (Timar, 2006). 
Due to the inherently political nature of categorical funding, categorical funds were not 
equitably allocated across districts (Loeb et al., 2008; Timar, 1994; Timar & Roza, 2010). Although 
districts serving greater proportions of low-income students generally received more categorical 
funding than other districts, categorical funding was not systematically allocated to districts on the 
basis of students’ needs (Loeb et al., 2008; Timar, 1994). Moreover, there was substantial variation in 
categorical funding for districts with similar student populations (Weston, 2011).  
Brewer and Smith (2008) also argued that the state’s categorical funding was inefficient—a 
“one size fits all” solution (pp. 31-32). Similarly, Weston (2011) contended that restrictive, 
categorical funding may prevent districts from allocating resources to meet local needs, which may 
                                                 
4 The increased sales tax is set to expire in 2016, and the increased income tax for households earning more 
than $250,000 annually is set to expire in 2018.  
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be particularly problematic in a state as large and diverse as California. Loeb et al. (2008) also 
pointed to inefficiencies by arguing that the state’s categorical funding system was not designed to 
help district leaders meet their goals for student performance; rather, it was designed to monitor 
district compliance with state regulations, and district leaders had to spend substantial resources to 
ensure such compliance. Finally, Duncombe and Yinger (2006) found categorical funding in 
California to be inefficient because the extent of categorical funding was negatively correlated with 
districts’ abilities to improve student achievement.  
Experts in California school finance have argued that over time, California’s education 
finance system became overly complex and convoluted (Bersin et al., 2008; Kirst, 2006). Timar 
(2006) aptly concluded: 
 
The current system of school finance [in California] is one that has been cobbled 
together in response to various pressures over the past thirty-some years. What is 
missing from the resulting patchwork of policies is an underlying framework or set 
of principles to guide the system. As a result, the system has little coherence or 
clarity. For instance, the policy goal of inter-district equalization is achieved through 
revenue limits, but undone by categorical programs. (p. 31) 
 
The state’s education finance system was ripe for change when Governor Brown and the California 
legislature signed into law the Local Control Funding Formula, which replaced California’s previous 
school funding formula with a more streamlined, transparent, and equitable formula.  
Overview of the Local Control Funding Formula 
The Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) increased local control in education. Local 
control under the LCFF is increased fiscal flexibility for district officials, increased community 
involvement in district decisions, and increased district oversight by county office of education 
(COE) officials. In the next two sections, we explain the new funding formula and the new Local 
Control Accountability Plan (LCAP) requirement of the LCFF.  
New Funding Formula 
One premise of the LCFF is to provide more dollars for general education purposes to 
districts that serve greater proportions of targeted—low-income, English learner (EL), and foster 
youth—students as opposed to providing all districts with roughly the same per-pupil amount as 
under the old system (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2013). The new funding formula 
accomplishes this goal by allocating state dollars for general education purposes in terms of base, 
supplemental, and concentration grants (Taylor, 2013). Base grants, which represent the bulk of the 
funding, are based on districts’ average daily attendance in four grade spans: (a) $7,557 per student 
for grades K–3, (b) $6,947 per student for grades 4–6, (c) $7,154 per student for grades 7–8, and (d) 
$8,505 per student for grades 9–12 (Taylor, 2013).  
The LCFF provides additional funds, or supplemental grants, for targeted student 
populations. Each district receives an additional 20% of the grade-span base rate for each student 
who qualifies for free or reduced-priced meals, who is an EL, or who is a foster youth (Taylor, 
2013). Supplemental grants are based on unduplicated counts of targeted students; in other words, a 
district will receive a maximum adjustment of 20% above the grade-span base grant for any one 
student, even if that student falls into more than one targeted subgroup (Taylor, 2013). Finally, 
districts receive concentration grants if more than 55% of students are targeted students; for each 
targeted student above the 55% threshold, the district receives an additional 50% of the grade-span 
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base grant (Taylor, 2013). Table 1 shows how state aid for general education purposes is related to 
the proportion of targeted students in the district. For example, districts with 100% of targeted 
students receive 42% more per pupil than districts with no targeted students. The new funding 
formula also re-directed approximately 48% of prior state categorical aid into base, supplemental, 
and concentration grants.   
 
Table 1 
Per-Pupil Funding By District Characteristics (California Department of Education, 2015) 
District Characteristics 
 
% Increase in the Average Per-Pupil Expenditure 
Compared with a District with 0% Targeted Students 
District with 25% targeted students 
 
5% 
District with 50% targeted students 
 
10% 
District with 75% targeted students 
 
25% 
District with 100% targeted students 
42% 
Note: These percentages represent funding when LCFF is fully implemented and before the 2014-15 cost of 
living adjustment (EdSource, 2016).  
 
Although the new funding formula is arguably more equitable than the prior funding 
formula in providing additional funding to districts serving greater proportions of targeted students, 
the additional funding may fall short of what some researchers estimate is needed (Levin et al., 
2013). For example, Duncombe and Yinger (2004) estimated that weights of at least two are needed 
per low-income and EL student to achieve the same educational outcomes as other students. 
Moreover, the LCFF provides additional funding based on unduplicated counts of targeted students, 
and it is unclear to what extent districts need additional funding per category of targeted students to 
achieve desired student outcomes (Loeb et al., 2008). 
Most districts received increased state aid under the LCFF compared with the prior 
education finance system, and districts with substantial proportions of targeted students received the 
greatest increase (Taylor, 2013). However, a hold harmless provision ensured that no district 
received less state aid than in the year prior to the enactment of the LCFF (Taylor, 2013). Basic aid 
or excess revenue districts benefitted from this hold harmless provision (Weston, 2013).5 However, 
a few basic aid or excess revenue districts—those that were not among the 10% of districts with the 
highest per-pupil expenditures in 2012–13—also received an economic recovery target add-on, 
which was “equal [to] the difference between the amount a district would have received under the 
old system and the amount a district would [be expected to] receive” under the LCFF (Taylor, 2013, 
p. 5). All basic aid or excess revenue districts are still required to complete LCAPs and meet other 
LCFF requirements (EdSource, 2016; Taylor, 2013).  
Given that no district lost money and most districts received increased state aid, the LCFF 
necessitated an additional $18 billion investment in public education compared with the funding 
levels prior to the LCFF’s enactment (Taylor, 2013). The state decided to phase in new LCFF 
funding levels over an eight-year period (EdSource, 2016). During the first year of LCFF 
                                                 
5 Not all districts that were classified as basic aid districts prior to the enactment of the LCFF were still 
classified as basic aid districts under the LCFF.  
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implementation, districts received a prorated amount of state aid based on their predicted amount 
under full implementation of the LCFF (EdSource, 2016). 
In re-directing 48% of state categorical aid to unrestricted funds, the LCFF increased district 
officials’ budgetary discretion. However, the LCFF does impose a few restrictions. First, districts 
must meet the law’s “proportionality requirement,” which requires districts to “increase or improve 
services for [targeted student populations] in proportion to the increase in funds apportioned on the 
basis of the number and concentration of [targeted students]” (Cal. Ed. Code, 2013a). However, 
“the exact meaning and regulatory effect of this proportionality clause is currently unknown” 
(Taylor, 2013, p. 6). For example, how does one increase services by a certain percentage when 
services are not measured in units such as hours or dollars? Moreover, an increase in services does 
not necessarily mean an increase in expenditures.  
Second, districts are incentivized to lower class sizes for grades K–3 to no more than 24 
students per class because if districts do not, the state will allocate $712 less per student for all 
students in the K–3 grade span (Taylor, 2013). The one exception to this rule is that districts do not 
need to meet this class size requirement if the district has negotiated a collective bargaining 
agreement that specifies a higher maximum average class size (Taylor, 2013). Third, minor spending 
restrictions include that districts must maintain their current levels of spending on transportation 
and adult education, at least in the short term (Taylor, 2013). Finally, although the LCFF eliminated 
48% of state categorical aid, districts that still receive state categorical funds for various programs 
and services—including special education, preschool, after school programs, assessments, nutrition, 
adult education, and transportation—must spend the categorical funds on the specified programs 
(California Department of Education, 2014b).   
Local Control Accountability Plans (LCAPs) 
All districts and charter schools are required to develop and adopt an LCAP based on a 
template created by the State Board of Education (Taylor, 2013). In their LCAPs, district officials 
must (a) outline their goals around the state’s eight priorities, (b) report how they will allocate 
resources to meet their goals, (c) specify improved services for targeted student subgroups, and (d) 
describe how they engaged community members in district decision-making (Taylor, 2013). The 
LCFF requires district officials to engage their local communities in goal setting and resource 
allocation decisions (Affeldt, 2015), and the law requires COE officials to oversee the approval of 
districts’ LCAPs. All of these requirements are new under the LCFF.  
Districts were required to complete the LCAP template for the first time in the 2014–15 
academic year (Taylor, 2013). The LCAP template contained three primary sections (State Board of 
Education, 2013).6 In the first section, district officials described how they involved stakeholders in 
the process of developing the LCAP and the impact of stakeholders’ feedback on the LCAP (State 
Board of Education, 2013). Specifically, district officials reported, “What changes, if any, were made 
in the LCAP prior to adoption as a result of written comments or other feedback received by the 
local education agency through any of the [agency’s] engagement process” (State Board of 
Education, 2013, p. 4).  
According to the law, district officials should consult with teachers, principals, 
administrators, other school personnel, local bargaining units, parents, and pupils in developing their 
LCAPs (Cal. Educ. Code, 2013b). In addition, district officials must develop and consult with a 
parent advisory committee that includes parents of targeted student subgroups as well as with an 
                                                 
6 The State Board of Education revised the LCAP template, and districts used the new template to submit 
their annual LCAP revisions in spring 2015 (Association of California School Administrators, 2014). The new 
template follows a similar format as the original template.  
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EL-specific parent advisory committee if at least 15% of students and at least 50 pupils in the district 
are ELs (California County Superintendents Educational Services Association, 2014).7 The law 
requires that both parent committees review the LCAP (Taylor, 2013). Although the superintendent 
is not required to adopt the committees’ recommendations, he or she must respond in writing to 
recommendations made by the committees before the LCAP may be approved (Heilig, Ward, 
Weisman, & Cole, 2014).  
The second section of the LCAP focused on district goals. District officials formulated 
annual goals that addressed each of the state’s eight priority areas: basic services, course access, 
implementation of state standards, parent involvement, pupil achievement, pupil engagement, 
school climate, and other pupil outcomes (Taylor, 2013). District officials were also able to include 
their own goals even if their goals did not directly address one of the state’s eight priorities (State 
Board of Education, 2013). Officials then had to identify the schools and numerically significant 
student groups for which the goals were applicable and determine metrics by which to assess their 
progress toward meeting those goals (California County Superintendents Educational Services 
Association, 2014).8  At a minimum, district officials were supposed to incorporate into their LCAPs 
the 24 state-required metrics—such as school attendance rates—that measure progress towards each 
of the state’s priority areas (Affeldt, 2015). Finally, on the basis of the selected metrics, district 
officials had to specify progress indicators for all students and for targeted student subgroups by 
which to determine if districts were meeting their goals for the baseline year (2014–15) as well as for 
the following two years (State Board of Education, 2013). In other words, districts’ goals had to be 
measurable.  
In the third and final section of the LCAP, district officials reported the specific actions they 
would take to meet their goals and the services they would provide for all students and for targeted 
student subgroups (California County Superintendents Educational Services Association, 2014; State 
Board of Education, 2013). Officials also had to reference “all fund sources used to support actions 
and services” outlined in the LCAP for all students and for targeted student subgroups (State Board 
of Education, 2013, p. 7; Taylor, 2013).  
Once adopted, the LCAP is effective for three years, and each year district officials must 
“review the district’s progress towards meeting the goals set forth in its LCAP, assess the 
effectiveness of the specific actions taken toward achieving these goals, and describe any changes the 
district will make as a result of this review and assessment” (Taylor, 2013, pp. 12-13). District 
officials must also annually update the expenditures that are tied to specific actions and services for 
all students and for targeted students (State Board of Education, 2013). 
Although COEs have traditionally held an oversight role for the districts that they serve, the 
LCFF dramatically expands their role in this regard (California County Superintendents Educational 
Services Association, 2014). Under the LCFF, the state assigns the COEs the responsibility of 
approving, requiring modifications to, or denying districts’ LCAPs (California County 
                                                 
7 Although not specifically required by the law, according to the California County Superintendents 
Educational Services Association (2014), which helps COEs implement statewide programs, district officials 
should also solicit feedback from stakeholders representing ethnic subgroups, socioeconomically 
disadvantaged pupils, and pupils with disabilities when there are at least 30 students in the subgroup. Foster 
youth are also listed as a subgroup, but the threshold is lower, with at least 15 students constituting a 
subgroup. 
8 “To be numerically significant, a district must have at least 30 students in a subgroup, with the exception of 
foster youth, for which districts must have at least 15 students” (Taylor, 2013, p. 10). 
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Superintendents Educational Services Association, 2014).9 The three statutory criteria that determine 
whether the LCAP is eligible for approval are (a) that it adheres to the State Board of Education 
template, (b) that there are sufficient expenditures listed in the LCAP to fund the district’s stated 
actions and services, and (c) that the district shows the proportionality requirement is satisfied 
(California County Superintendents Educational Services Association, 2014; Cal. Educ. Code, 
2013c).  
When districts’ LCAPs do not meet these three criteria, COE officials must take additional 
steps (Taylor, 2013). COE officials may provide technical assistance to district officials, assign an 
academic expert to assist the district officials in identifying and implementing effective programs, 
and/or refer the district to the California Collaborative for Educational Excellence, a new state 
agency that will provide support to struggling districts (Cal. Educ. Code, 2013d).  
The state will also eventually release new rubrics that the COEs will use to evaluate district 
LCAPs and identify districts that are in need of assistance (Taylor 2013). These rubrics will “serve as 
tools to ensure [districts] are able to align resources to implement strategies that result in meaningful 
student outcomes” and identify areas “in need of additional support to meet the adopted standards 
for district and school performance relative to the state priorities” (State Board of Education, 2015, 
p. 4).  
Literature Review  
This study investigates how district officials used their new fiscal flexibility and engaged their local 
communities in the initial stages of the implementation of the Local Control Funding Formula 
(LCFF). In the first section of this literature review, we discuss how district and school leaders have 
used increased fiscal flexibility under past reforms and if increased fiscal flexibility has resulted in 
improved outcomes. In the second section of this literature review, we summarize research on how 
district and school leaders have engaged their local communities, the challenges that leaders have 
faced in attempting to engage their local communities, and how meaningful community engagement 
can be achieved.  
Fiscal Flexibility 
This study investigates how district officials used their increased fiscal flexibility over state 
categorical dollars under the LCFF. The most relevant example of a past reform similar to the LCFF 
context was the California legislature’s 2008 decision to temporarily suspend state categorical fund 
spending restrictions for select categorical programs (Taylor, 2010). To help districts cope with the 
2008 budget crisis and large revenue cuts to education, the California legislature temporarily 
suspended categorical funding restrictions for approximately 40 state categorical funds out of a total 
60 state categorical funds (Taylor, 2010; Weston, 2011).10 The 40 categorical funds were lumped 
together into a “flex item” that essentially served as unrestricted funds that could be used for any 
education purpose, as long as the allocation of funds was discussed at a regularly scheduled and 
public hearing (Taylor, 2010, p. 5). The 40 categorical funds accounted for $4.5 billion, 38% of state 
                                                 
9 COEs receive additional funding for these oversight responsibilities under the LCFF. Oversight 
responsibilities are funded on the basis of (a) a minimum grant per county, (b) the number of districts in the 
county, and (c) the average daily attendance in the county (California Department of Education, 2015). 
10 The California legislature also loosened other state restrictions (see Taylor, 2010). 
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categorical funds, or 7% of all general purpose funds for the average district (Taylor, 2010; Weston, 
2011). At the same time, California districts received $6 billion in flexible federal stimulus funding 
for K–12 education from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Taylor, 2010).  
In a study of 10 diverse districts in California, Fuller, Marsh, Stecher, and Timar (2011) 
investigated how district officials used their new fiscal flexibility when also facing severe budget cuts. 
The authors found that in nine out of the 10 districts, district leaders combined flex item funds with 
their general education funds, and in 50% of districts, leaders re-allocated the newly flexible funds to 
balance their budgets and minimize layoffs. District leaders selectively cut back categorical programs, 
and leaders did not use “hard evidence” to decide which programs to cut (Fuller et al., 2011, p. iv). 
In a few cases, district leaders used flex item funds to fund new initiatives (Fuller et al., 2011). 
Although district leaders liked their new fiscal flexibility, they continued to feel constrained by 
preexisting legal mandates, student needs, union contracts, and budget shortfalls (Fuller et al., 2010). 
Although district leaders gathered input from stakeholders on district goals and priorities, 
leaders generally decided how to allocate the flex item funds (Fuller et al., 2011). Some district 
leaders felt that they did not have adequate time to involve many stakeholders due to the tight 
timeline of re-budgeting in the middle of the academic year. One district leader reporting making 
decisions before advocacy groups could form and oppose his/her decisions (Fuller et al., 2011). 
Fuller et al. (2011) also found that in most districts, principals and school staff were not involved in 
the resource allocation decision process.  
Another researcher surveyed leaders in California districts to determine how they allocated 
their flex item funds (Taylor, 2010). Although the survey response rate was 22%, the researcher 
argued that the survey sample was representative of all districts in California: The district leaders 
who completed the survey represented 37% of the state’s total student enrollment, and district 
leaders in half of the 10 largest districts in California participated in the survey (Taylor, 2010). The 
survey results indicated that the majority of district leaders found that the new fiscal flexibility made 
it easier for them to balance their budgets and align resources with their priorities (Taylor, 2010). On 
the other hand, the majority of district leaders were unclear as to how much funding should be 
allocated directly to school sites (Taylor, 2010). District leaders preferred that additional categorical 
funds had been included in the flex item (Taylor, 2010).  
According to these same survey results, more than 60% of district leaders shifted money 
away from the prior categorical programs (including adult education, high school class size 
reduction, deferred maintenance, school and library improvements, professional development, 
school safety, arts and music, gifted and talented education, instructional materials, supplemental 
instruction, and counseling) and instead, re-allocated these funds to support direct classroom 
instruction (Taylor, 2010). Some of the categorical funds were affected in major ways while others 
were only affected in minor ways (Taylor, 2010). When funds were re-directed away from these 
categorical programs, district leaders made corresponding programmatic changes (Taylor, 2010). 
Regarding how district leaders allocated the federal stimulus funding, the majority of district leaders 
used federal funds to minimize teacher layoffs, make one-time purchases, and restore spending 
reductions to affected categorical programs (Taylor, 2010). 
The two previous studies relied on district leaders’ self reports of how they allocated 
resources in 2009. Because the state’s accounting system no longer required district leaders to 
specify how much they allocated for any categorical program included in the flex item and because 
flex item funds could be spent on any general education purpose, researchers could not determine 
how district leaders allocated their flex item funds in “any systematic way” (Weston, 2011, p. 29).  
Other reforms have focused on increasing budgetary discretion at the school level. At first 
glance, weighted student funding or site-based budgeting appears to be similar to the LCFF’s 
funding formula. Under a weighted student funding system, districts allocate money directly to 
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schools on the basis of a formula that takes into account school and student characteristics (Levin et 
al., 2013); schools with greater proportions of high-need students receive additional resources, 
although which students generate additional funding and how much funding is generated by certain 
student groups varies across contexts (Levin et al., 2013). Additional resources may also be allocated 
to schools on the basis of school characteristics such as geographic isolation, grade level type, and 
school size (Levin et al., 2013). Typically, under a weighted student funding system, school staff 
experience increased autonomy in determining school goals and budgets (Shambaugh, Chambers, & 
DeLancey, 2008), although there is variability across school sites in the degree to which school staff 
control budget decisions (Levin et al., 2013). 
Two California districts—Oakland and San Francisco—implemented weighted student 
funding formulas (Chambers, Shambaugh, Levin, Muraki, & Poland, 2008). One study of these two 
reforms found that substantial variation in school-level respondents’ perceptions of how much 
budgetary discretion they were afforded (Chambers et al., 2008). Another study of the weighted 
student formula in San Francisco only found that some respondents felt that schools had little 
budgetary discretion because funding was tight and because teachers’ salaries and benefits accounted 
for 80–85% of schools’ budgets (Shambaugh et al., 2008). The authors were not able to determine 
exactly how much budgetary discretion school leaders in San Francisco had; the authors could not 
determine what proportion of schools’ budgets were truly flexible funds because the district could 
not provide the total amount of unrestricted funds that were allocated to each school site 
(Shambaugh et al., 2008). 
Respondents in both districts reported making staffing changes as a result of the reforms 
(Chambers et al., 2008). However, the number of full-time staff per student remained unchanged in 
both districts after the implementation of the weighted student formulas (Chambers et al., 2008), 
and the distribution of novice teachers across schools in the district remained unchanged 
(Chambers, Levin, & Shambaugh, 2010). Further, respondents reported that few programmatic 
changes were made as a result of the new weighted student formulas (Chambers et al., 2008). Finally, 
the authors noted varying capacity at the school level to make appropriate resource allocation 
decisions (Chambers et al., 2008).  
Prior studies on fiscal flexibility reforms point to the difficulty in analyzing resource 
allocation, given the nature of fiscal flexibility (Chambers et al., 2010; Shambaugh et al., 2008; 
Weston, 2011). In sum, there is limited evidence on the effects of fiscal flexibility (Fuller et al., 2011; 
Petko, 2005). Petko (2015) concluded that there is not enough evidence to embrace reforms 
involving student weighted formulas or local control in general.  
The LCFF can be classified as a local control reform, and local control can be generally 
characterized as “efforts to strengthen education by placing greater rights and responsibilities in the 
hands of lower level participants,” where lower level participants may refer to a range of 
stakeholders with various levels of authority, including teachers, parents, community members, 
principals, district officials, school board members, and mayors (Meyer, 2009, p. 457; Walberg, Paik, 
Komukai, & Freeman, 2000). In general, past local control reforms have not proven to be effective 
(Elmore, 1993; Malen, 2011; Meyer, 2009). Studies have found that merely shifting authority from a 
higher to a lower level and vice versa has had “little discernible effect on the efficiency, 
accountability, or effectiveness of public schools” (Elmore, 1993, p. 34). Meyer (2009) 
recommended that local control reforms should be accompanied with “monitoring and 
accountability rules that help us to know if the new model worked” (p. 470).   
This study investigates how district officials responded to increased fiscal flexibility over 
state dollars in the early stages of the implementation of the LCFF. Similar to prior studies, this 
study also relies on district officials’ self reports of how they allocated resources (Fuller et al., 2011; 
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Taylor, 2010). Although the original intent of the study team was to report on how district officials 
allocated their resources, the available evidence was not sufficient for the study team to 
systematically determine how resources were allocated. In addition, given that the LCFF was 
recently implemented when the study team collected the data, the team did not attempt to 
investigate any impacts of LCFF implementation. This study adds to the literature by analyzing how 
district officials responded to increased fiscal flexibility under the LCFF.  
Community Engagement 
The LCFF requires district officials to solicit feedback from their local communities on 
district goals, priorities, and budget decisions and to develop their Local Control Accountability 
Plans (LCAPs) in collaboration with stakeholders (Affeldt, 2015). Historically, there have been 
various efforts across the country to engage local communities and parents in school-level 
decisions—such as through local school or site-based councils (Malen, 1999; Ortiz & Ogawa, 2000). 
According to our recent literature review, there have been few opportunities for community 
members and parents to engage in district-level decisions, with the exception of participation on 
school boards.  
The distinction between district-level and school-level community engagement is nontrivial 
because research has shown that schools within a district, particularly in a large district, can vary 
substantially in terms of important aspects such as teacher quality and student demographics 
(Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). Moreover, many of the prior community engagement 
reforms—including local school councils and district-level school boards—have involved 
community engagement in terms of a few elected members from the community (Ortiz & Ogawa, 
2000); under the LCFF, district officials are required to engage their communities at large (Affeldt, 
2015). Nevertheless, prior studies on community engagement reforms have implications for the 
LCFF because they have documented the variation in community engagement across sites, the 
challenges with engaging traditionally underserved community members, and the structures that are 
necessary for meaningful community engagement to occur (Best & Dunlap, 2012; Gutmann & 
Thompson, 2004; Kirst, 2010; Malen, 1999). 
Local school councils or site-based councils are one example of a widely implemented 
reform that focused on engaging community members in school-level decision-making. Similar to 
the premise of the LCFF, the premise of these councils was to give more decision-making authority 
to local actors, including parents and teachers (Malen, 1999). The creation of local school councils 
resulted in meaningful community engagement when community members had “significant 
influence on significant issues” (Malen, 1999, p. 210). However, Ortiz and Ogawa (2000) noted that 
councils varied in the extent to which local actors other than school administrators had decision-
making authority. For example, Moore (2002) analyzed research conducted on local school councils 
in Chicago and found that when the local school councils were comprised largely of parent and 
community members as opposed to solely school staff, the local school councils had substantial 
decision-making authority. According to Moore (2002), “[The local school councils] hired their 
school’s principal…set priorities for school improvement, and determined the school’s budget” (p. 
6). On the other hand, Malen (1999) noted that councils often “reflected and reinforced a traditional 
pattern of power wherein professionals, notably principals, control school policy, teachers control 
instruction, and parents provide support” (p. 210). Meyer (2009) remarked that there are “as many 
interpretations [of reforms] as there are parties to the process” (p. 468).  
Community members may be involved with district-level decision-making through school 
boards. Members of the community may be elected or appointed to serve on school boards (Center 
for Public Education, 2011). Traditionally, “School boards [have done] things like set the budgets, 
establish school boundaries and set school policies” (Center for Public Education, 2011, para. 2). 
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However, “Local school boards...have been losing influence over education programs for some time 
to state and federal officials and other interests” (Kirst, 2010, p. 1). Instead of setting agendas and 
budgets, school boards are frequently “reactive forces trying to juggle diverse and changing 
coalitions across different issues and levels of government” (Kirst, 2010, p. 7). 
Studies on community engagement have found that a community’s ability to engage in public 
education depends, in part, on local capacity (Best & Dunlap, 2012; Gold & Simon, 2004; Gold, 
Simon, Cucchiara, Mitchell, & Riffer, 2007; Noguera, 2002; Uslaner & Brown, 2005). Studies have 
shown that low-income and underrepresented groups tend to be less involved than more affluent 
community members in all types of civic life such as voting, community organizing, and 
volunteering (Uslaner & Brown, 2005). In education, “Where poverty is concentrated and poor 
people are socially isolated, the parents of the children who experience the greatest difficulty in 
school also tend to be the least involved” (Noguera, 2002, p. 3). Best and Dunlap (2012) found that 
not all families have the time and resources to be highly involved; other barriers to family 
involvement include “speaking a language that is unknown or devalued in a school, immigration 
status, encountering bias, or previous negative experiences with the education system” (p. 1). 
Engaging an underserved community that has not had a strong background in civic engagement first 
requires building the civic capacity of community members (Gold & Simon, 2004; Gold et al., 2007).  
Studies on community engagement have also identified the necessary—but not sufficient—
structures that must exist for community members to be become meaningfully engaged in public 
education. Meaningful community engagement is facilitated by an informed public and transparency 
in decision-making (Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; Noguera, 2004). To be effective, meaningful 
community engagement requires district and school staff to keep the public informed about district 
and school plans and priorities as well as the public’s rights and responsibilities (Gold et al., 2007; 
Noguera, 2004). In addition, transparency of information is required for the community “to be able 
to evaluate what works and what does not work” (Gold et al., 2007, p. 42). When only a few 
stakeholders have full information, community engagement is reduced to engagement of a “small 
number of well-organized people,” and the public at large is unable to hold districts and schools 
accountable (Noguera, 2004, p. 2163; Rennee & McAllister, 2011).  
Another requirement for community engagement to be successful is stakeholder 
collaboration, which requires that stakeholders see beyond their own interests to create agendas that 
serve all citizens (Gold et al., 2007). Collaboration is challenging, however, because “groups have 
distinct interests that often lead them to work against each other in ways that dissipate energies and 
blunt reform efforts” (Stone, Henig, Jones, & Pierannunzi, 2001, p. 140). In addition, advocacy and 
interest groups can exacerbate collaboration challenges (Gold et al., 2007; Stone et al., 2001; 
Yankelovich, Rosell, Gantwerk, & Friedman, 2006). For example, through case studies of local 
organizational involvement in public education, Gold et al. (2007) found that special interest groups 
“focused almost exclusively on the interests of their separate constituency or groups [which] 
contributed to an absence of discussion about how best to meet the needs for broader community 
well-being” (p. 41). Beliefs about others’ perceived lack of competence may also impede 
collaboration (Shatkin & Gershberg, 2007). One study found that principals and teachers frequently 
initially resisted community engagement out of concern that the public would make ill-informed 
decisions (Shatkin & Gershberg, 2007).  
This literature review points to the challenges in engaging local communities in public 
education and foreshadows the challenges that California’s district officials will likely encounter in 
engaging their local communities in district decisions as required by the LCFF. This study adds to 
the literature by documenting how district officials attempted to engage their local communities to 
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meet the new LCFF requirements and by discussing some of the challenges and successes that 
district officials faced.  
Data and Methods 
Data were collected by a team of 12 independent researchers from June to October of 2014. 
To gain background information on the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF), team members 
first interviewed state policymakers, legislative staff, and leaders of organizations who were closely 
involved with designing the LCFF and with supporting districts in implementing the LCFF. The 
team also reviewed approximately 40 districts’ Local Control Accountability Plans (LCAPs), which 
were available online.  
The team then selectively sampled 10 districts across California in which to conduct 
interviews. Selected districts were diverse in terms of enrollment, geographic region, urbanicity, and 
proportions of English learner (EL) and low-income students. The team ensured that at least one 
rural district and at least one basic aid district were sampled. Although the team strived to ensure 
that the sample was reasonably representative of districts in the state, the sample of districts and 
interviewees may not be representative of all districts and stakeholders in California, given the large 
number of districts in California and the ranges of district needs and stakeholder viewpoints across 
the state.  
 
Table 2  
Number of Study Districts by District Characteristics  
Enrollment 
 
<10,000 
students 
10,000–25,000 
students 
25,000–50,000 
students 
>50,000 
students 
Number of districts 
 
3 3 2 2 
Geographic Region 
 
 
Southern CA Central Valley Bay Area Northern CA 
Number of districts 
 
2 1 3 4 
Urbanicity Small town in a 
remote area 
 
Midsize town Suburb outside a 
large city 
Large city 
Number of districts 
 
3 3 1 3 
Proportion of EL 
students 
 
<25% 25–50% 50–75% >75% 
Number of districts 
 
2 6 1 1 
Proportion of low-
income students 
 
<25% 25–50% 50–75% >75% 
Number of districts 
 
1 2 4 3 
Note: Adapted from Humphrey & Koppich, 2014 
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In each of the 10 districts, the team conducted interviews with district officials, stakeholders, 
and county office of education (COE) officials.11 For each district, the team interviewed the 
superintendent and the district official responsible for the budget and requested interviews with the 
chief academic officer, the human resource officer, and personnel responsible for overseeing EL, 
foster youth, special education, and early childhood education programs (see Table 3).12 The team 
also interviewed district officials holding other positions who were identified as having been heavily 
involved in the LCAP creation process. Additionally, the team interviewed district stakeholders such 
as school board members, union representatives, and parents. The team conducted a total of 71 
interviews across the 10 districts. Prior to conducting interviews, the team reviewed all 10 districts’ 
LCAPs along with minutes of local school board meetings and other documents available on district 
websites. 
Table 3 
Number of Interviews Conducted with District Officials and Stakeholders by Position  
District Officials 
 
Number of Interviews Conducted 
Superintendent 10 
Budget/financial officer 9 
Assistant superintendent 8 
Academic officer 4 
Human resources officer 4 
Special education officer 4 
English learner office 6 
Foster youth officer 3 
Early childhood officer 2 
Other district staff 5 
Total number of interviews with district officials 51 
Other Stakeholders 
 
Number of Interviews Conducted 
Union member 7 
School board member 6 
Parent 7 
Total number of interviews with stakeholders 20 
Total number of interviews 71 
Note: Some district staff had multiple roles. Thus, the total number of interviews with district staff (51) does 
not equal the sum of the numbers of interviews of district staff by position. Adapted from Humphrey & 
Koppich, 2014. 
 
In eight of the 10 districts, the team also interviewed COE officials. Further, the team 
conducted phone interviews with officials from an additional 14 COEs around the state. Overall, the 
team interviewed officials at 22 different COEs out of the total 58 COEs in California; those 22 
COEs serve 458 districts in California. 
                                                 
11 Please see the Appendix for the interview protocols.  
12 In one of the 10 districts, the study team was not able to interview the person responsible for the budget.  
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Findings emerged primarily from the interview data but were triangulated with district 
LCAPs, school board minutes, and other district documents. The research team used a two-step 
analysis process. First, researchers responsible for each district site visit and COE interview coded 
the data and wrote a detailed summary of findings across several categories—e.g., general view of 
the LCFF, resource allocation, community engagement, the budget and LCAP development 
processes, and COE support. Then, all team members participated in a 2-day in-person analysis 
meeting to discuss the findings across all sites and generate themes, noting similarities and 
differences across the 10 districts and 22 COEs. Thus, the team’s findings represent those from the 
entire sample and are not heavily dependent on findings in any one district or COE.  
We built on the research team’s work and conducted a secondary data analysis. Humphrey 
and Koppich’s (2014) report was intended to provide high-level feedback to state policymakers, and 
our intention was to include more data and detail in the presentation of the findings. We reviewed all 
of the interview data and re-coded all of the data according to the team’s major findings. We also 
asked members of the study team to review our findings to ensure that the substance and tone of 
our presentation of the findings were consistent with the study team’s initial findings. Although our 
findings are consistent with those initially published by Humphrey and Koppich (2014), we highlight 
additional findings and provide additional evidence and detail for the findings presented in 
Humphrey and Koppich’s report.  
Findings 
Respondents viewed the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) with cautious optimism. 
District and county office of education (COE) officials liked the new school funding formula but 
were still concerned about the adequacy of funding in California. Increased fiscal flexibility led to 
some district officials engaging in needs-based budgeting for the first time and increased 
collaboration among department heads for nearly all study districts. However, some district and 
COE officials were concerned that the state will legislate tighter requirements on the use of state 
funds. 
The Local Control Accountability Plan (LCAP) development process was beneficial for 
some districts, but most district officials faced a number of challenges in developing LCAPs. District 
officials struggled to define the purpose, audience, and scope of their LCAPs. The fast timeline and 
the time-consuming development process of the LCAP also posed challenges for district officials. In 
addition, although respondents positively viewed the community engagement requirement of the 
LCAP development process, district officials generally lacked the capacity and skillset to engage their 
local communities, particularly the families of the targeted student subgroups. COE officials also 
experienced capacity challenges and were concerned about their ongoing capacity to oversee district 
LCAPs, as required by the LCFF.  
The following two sections discuss these findings in more detail. The findings are organized 
by respondents’ viewpoints of the new school funding formula, increased fiscal flexibility, the 
process of developing LCAPs, COE officials’ new oversight roles, and districts’ attempts to engage 
their local communities.  
New Funding Formula 
District stakeholders praised the new funding formula, and most agreed that allocating more 
dollars to districts with larger proportions of low-income, English learner (EL), and foster youth 
students was the right thing to do. One district superintendent stated: 
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This governor and this state board [of education] did something that has never been 
done in the United States without a court case. It changed the distribution 
mechanism from an equality formula to an equity formula...I think that that unto 
itself is noteworthy, stunning, and amazing.  
 
Several COE and district officials, however, made the case for revising the formula to allocate 
supplemental and concentration dollars based on duplicated counts of targeted students as opposed to 
unduplicated counts. One district official commented that with unduplicated counts, districts were 
receiving additional dollars on the basis of the proportion of low-income students because the vast 
majority of ELs and foster youth were also low-income students. COE and district officials serving 
large proportions of students who were both low-income and EL argued that districts should receive 
additional resources to address both student poverty and English language proficiency.  
Although most district officials liked the equity component of the new funding formula, 
nearly all district officials were still concerned about the overall adequacy of funding. District 
officials that received additional funds this year because of the LCFF were appreciative of the new 
money, but district officials questioned whether the LCFF, even when fully implemented, would 
provide them with enough resources to offer a high-quality education to all students. Officials in 
districts with both small and large proportions of targeted students emphasized that funding is still 
not sufficient. More than one district official reiterated that even when LCFF is fully implemented, 
the average district will be only at its 2008 funding level. With the 2008 economic downtown, many 
districts had to cut back services, and some districts had deficit spending. One school board member 
said, “We are a cancer patient no longer in the emergency room but we are far away from 
adequacy.” One district official questioned whether the increased state funding was adequate to both 
restore basic services for all students and provide additional supports to targeted students: 
 
I think one of the hard parts though is that I don’t think that you can provide 
targeted supports on top of a foundation that is deficient and expect to get great 
results…. If you are able to [restore basic services] and then really truly supplement, 
then there are opportunities to have this really be a game changer for those 
subgroups and for all students. 
 
Although state funding for public education has increased over the last few years, districts faced 
new and rising costs that outweighed such increases. Some districts faced rising costs per pupil due 
to declining enrollment and increasing facility costs. The new pension obligation, which requires 
districts to absorb a larger share of the cost of teachers’ and other district employees’ pensions, 
concerned district officials in particular. For one district, this meant doubling the percentage of its 
budget that it currently contributes toward employees’ pensions. Some district officials were 
concerned that if funding for public education decreases and the new employee pension obligation 
stands, districts would not have adequate resources to maintain the programs and services that they 
currently offer. 
Fiscal Flexibility 
The LCFF afforded district officials increased flexibility in deciding how to allocate state 
funding, and they liked their new budgetary flexibility. One assistant superintendent stated, “One 
benefit is that the [leader] can say, this is a need in my community and this is where I want to put the 
money. That flexibility has been nice.” Another COE official stated, “I think it’s one of the most 
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positive things that happened to public education in the last 40 years. [The LCFF allows us to focus] 
attention on areas where we have the most need.” 
Some district officials were pleased with the reduction in state categorical funding. One 
budget director explained that categorical funding was problematic because there were a large 
number of categories and some “pots of money” contained insufficient funds to make significant 
programmatic improvements. Another superintendent argued that categorical funding was 
inefficient because it was impossible to spend the exact amount available in each categorical fund, 
and in some cases small amounts of funds remained. Having flexibility to use all available funds was 
a “big deal.”  
Other budget directors, although they supported the idea of increased fiscal flexibility, found 
the new changes to be daunting, particularly in the first year of implementation. One superintendent 
explained that although budget directors did not like categorical funding, they at least understood it, 
whereas the LCFF required districts to decide how to allocate resources that were once restricted, 
necessitating a budget process that differed from the way it has been done for the past 40 years. This 
superintendent noted that the LCFF was not a typical change, such as a change in textbooks, but 
was instead a “fundamental shift.” Similarly, other respondents referred to the LCFF as a “culture 
change,” “mind shift,” and “paradigm shift.” 
In some cases, fiscal flexibility sparked changes in the way district officials developed their 
budgets, and officials in a few districts moved to a needs-based budgeting process. As one district 
official described, “This year we began the [budget development] process from ‘What do we need?’ 
rather than from ‘What can we afford?’” In these districts, officials determined their priorities and 
needs first and then created the budget last. This was a change from the past when district officials 
started with the previous year’s budget and made only slight revisions to it due to restricted 
categorical funds. To assess their needs, determine priorities, and identify programs and services that 
would best meet their students’ needs, some district officials examined data about student 
performance, attendance, and course-taking patterns and reviewed information gathered from the 
community. One respondent stated, “This is a really big deal. I love it. We’re finally [asking] who are 
the students with the highest need and how do we address those needs?”  
On the other hand, according to one COE official, some district officials continued to let 
the “budget drive the decisions” by determining what they could afford and then creating district 
goals that fit the budget. In addition, officials in a few districts used their increased budget flexibility 
and influx of funds to address their structural deficits and/or restore programs, services, and staff 
positions that had been eliminated in recent years due to budget cuts. One COE official estimated 
that around 60% of its districts were still in “restoration mode” due to years of deficit spending. 
One district official described that the staff’s attitude was, “Let’s climb out of a hole.” However, 
even though some district officials used the majority of new funds to restore resources, some district 
officials still responded to stakeholder input by budgeting a few “high-priority, low-cost” items. A 
few district officials also noted that when the structural deficits were addressed, officials would be 
able to be more responsive to stakeholder input. Even if district officials did not budget their 
community’s high-priority items, many district officials did incorporate stakeholder input in setting 
district priorities, which may ultimately influence resource allocation decisions. 
Regardless of whether district officials shifted to needs-based budgeting, nearly all districts in 
the study shifted to joint program-fiscal teams to develop their budgets. Because the LCFF requires 
district officials to incorporate stakeholder input and explicitly tie dollars to district goals, budget 
offices could no longer develop the budget in isolation. Prior to the LCFF, district budget offices 
would determine how much money would be allocated to various departments based on available 
resources and categorical fund requirements. Each department would then create its own budget, 
and there was little to no discussion about how resources should be allocated among the different 
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departments. One district official concluded, “The LCAP process really pushed the emphasis on 
collaboration. We recognized that people were working in silos. And we had to change.”  
With the elimination of many state categorical funds and the increased state aid for most 
districts, district officials reported that LCFF resulted in changes to resource allocation. However, 
exactly how districts allocated base, supplemental, and concentration funds remains unclear. The 
state’s accounting system did not change under the LCFF. Thus, district officials continued to use 
the state’s standardized account code structure to report how they allocated unrestricted and 
categorical funding (California Department of Education, 2014b). Because base, supplemental, and 
concentration funds are all unrestricted funds under the LCFF, the state does not require district 
officials to differentiate how they allocated base, supplemental, and concentration dollars (California 
Department of Education, 2014b).  
According to the California Department of Education (2014b), district officials were 
supposed to report how they allocated supplemental and concentration funds in their LCAPs.13 
However, LCAPs are submitted for review to the COEs, not to the state. Moreover, it was 
impossible for the study team to determine exactly how district officials allocated these funds via 
district LCAPs. First, the LCAP is a repetitive Microsoft Word template, not a sophisticated budget 
tool. Second, rather than providing an exhaustive list of expenditures, districts’ LCAPs highlighted 
districts’ goals and tied expenditures to the listed goals. We found that district officials did not 
always include supplemental and concentration dollars that were not tied to any district goal; for 
example, when one district used supplemental and concentration funds to restore the budget deficit, 
this allocation of funds was not listed in the district’s LCAP. Finally, we found that the sum of 
supplemental and concentration dollars listed in districts’ LCAPs generally did not match the 
amount of supplemental and concentration dollars allocated to districts.  
When asked how they allocated resources, district officials reported using new state funds 
for the implementation of Common Core standards (including professional development for 
teachers), new or improved technologies, academic interventions, expanded learning time in the 
summer and/or after school, additional instructional staff (e.g., reading specialists, instructional 
coaches, and more teachers for class size reduction purposes), behavioral and social-emotional 
supports for students (e.g., counselors), facility improvements, and additional operations staff (e.g., 
janitors and plant managers). Five districts raised teacher salaries. As one superintendent said, “We 
haven’t given raises in four years. We couldn’t let that go on.” District officials also reported funding 
new supports and programs for targeted students. District officials reported using new dollars to 
expand programs for EL students, enhance social services for foster youth, and add parent liaisons 
to better communicate with underserved communities. Some district officials reported that the 
LCFF will allow them to do more for targeted groups in the future. 
District officials debated whether to allocate more state funds directly to school sites. Six 
(out of 10) study districts allocated a portion of the state money directly to school sites, and several 
districts used formulas that based school allocations on proportions of targeted students in the 
schools. Some district officials believed that schools should receive increased budget discretion 
under the LCFF. Alternatively, some district officials believed that because the district would be held 
responsible for meeting the goals outlined in their LCAP, resource allocation should be determined 
at the district level. 
District officials also struggled with how to allocate their supplemental and concentration 
funds. Officials were not certain if they could use these funds district-wide or if the funds had to be 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that the LCAP template instructions only required district officials to list supplemental 
and concentration dollars that were tied to specific actions and services outlined in the LCAP. 
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spent on services for targeted student populations. Although these funds are unrestricted, officials 
are required to meet the proportionality requirement of the LCFF and “increase or improve 
services” (Taylor, 2013, p. 6) for targeted students by a certain percentage. However, many 
respondents were uncertain about what this requirement meant in practice. In addition, the LCAP 
template required district officials to (a) differentiate expenditures for actions and services for all 
students and for targeted student subgroups and (b) provide justification if supplemental or 
concentration funds were allocated district-wide when less than 55% of the students in the district 
were members of targeted student subgroups—districts had to justify that the resource allocation 
decision was the “most effective use of funds to meet the district’s goals” in the state’s eight priority 
areas for targeted student subgroups (State Board of Education, 2013, p. 10). These requirements—
along with limited guidance from the state—confused district officials and caused them to question 
if supplemental and concentration funds were truly unrestricted funds or if the funds were intended 
only for targeted student populations, like categorical funds.  
District officials believed that the state would eventually ask them how they spent their 
supplemental and concentration dollars. All of the district officials interviewed by the research team 
kept track of how they spent their supplemental and concentration funds in their own accounting 
system, even though they were not required to do so by the state. Moreover, district officials were 
very concerned that the state will ultimately legislate tighter requirements on the use of supplemental 
and concentration funds. As a result, district officials worried that their new fiscal flexibility was 
temporary.  
Yet district officials were adamant that their newfound fiscal flexibility should not be 
revoked. District officials agreed that they should be held accountable for results—especially for 
improved outcomes for targeted students—but they wanted the freedom to achieve the results in 
the way they thought best. As one district official remarked, “If they’re truly flexible dollars, then let 
us control [them].”  
District and COE officials wanted more time to adjust to the new system in general before 
the state made any substantial changes to the law. One respondent echoed a common plea: “Please 
leave it alone. Give us time to get used to it, to learn how to work with it, and to make it work for 
us.” Another respondent stated, “We need consistent law and policy… If we apply the resources 
and districts are given time, we’ll see good things for kids. That’s our goal.”  
LCAP Development 
Despite the challenges of developing LCAPs for the first time under a tight timeline, several 
district officials noted that the LCAP development process was beneficial because it involved 
multiple stakeholders at the district level and resulted in substantially more collaboration across 
departments than what was typical:  
 
The LCAP development was a painful but good process. It brought together units 
that hadn’t worked together before. It forces us to think about how to improve 
student learning. Now many of us have a better idea about how our work meshes 
with the work of others. 
 
Yet district officials faced a number of challenges in developing LCAPs. One challenge stemmed 
from uncertainty about the purpose of the LCAP. District officials struggled to determine whether 
the LCAP was essentially a template that needed to be filled out or a plan that “told their story.” 
Some district officials worked with outside organizations that told them that the purpose of the 
LCAP was to tell the story of what students in their districts needed and how the district was going 
to meet those needs. However, many district officials quickly determined that telling their story in 
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their LCAP was not an easy task. They struggled to both outline their priorities and goals in a 
readable way and fulfill the numerous requirements of the template. As one county superintendent 
stated, “[District] people got excited about telling their own story until they started getting into the 
template and the Word document, which was super tedious and people got [discouraged].” As such, 
many district and COE officials questioned the purpose of the document and concluded that the 
LCAP was essentially one more compliance document that they had to fill out. One county 
superintendent said, “Let’s accept the fact that the template is a compliance piece of paper and tell 
the story with another piece of paper that is a high-level executive summary.” 
Because the LCAP felt like a compliance document, district officials also questioned the 
intended audience of their LCAPs. They struggled to produce LCAPs that were both comprehensive 
and accessible to the general public. While district officials wanted to reference all their sources of 
funding—including state and federal dollars—so that readers would have a clear picture of how the 
district was spending its money, they knew that in doing so the document would not be readable and 
accessible for the average community member. Ultimately, many district officials determined that it 
was more important to include all sources of funding for actions and services listed in their LCAP in 
order to obtain COE approval and settled for the fact that their LCAP would not be 
comprehensible for the average community member.  
Another challenge for district officials was that the LCAP template required district officials 
to separately report expenditures for actions and services for all students and for targeted student 
subgroups. As a result, some district officials found it difficult to determine which expenditures (e.g., 
base, supplemental, or concentration) should be allocated to which student populations (e.g., all 
students or low-income, EL, or foster youth students only). One COE official said that was “a big 
issue” in districts serving high proportions of both low-income and EL students. Although district 
officials felt that the same set of services was applicable to both low-income and EL students, the 
COE officials pushed the district officials to consider differences in the needs of EL and low-
income students.  
In addition to the lack of clarity around resource allocation, districts’ LCAPs often did not 
clearly outline progress indicators on which to determine if district goals have been met (e.g., 
decrease truancy by 5% each year). According to COE officials, identifying progress indicators was 
the most challenging aspect of the LCAP development process for district officials. In our review of 
40 LCAPs, the research team found few examples of clear and specific progress indicators. Because 
districts’ goals were at times broad, it was difficult to measure success in achieving goals with 
specific progress indicators. For example, one district had the goal of increasing students’ feelings of 
safety, but it was unclear how progress would be evaluated or which metric would be used to 
determine that progress had been made. In addition, districts officials did not always have the 
necessary baseline data to determine appropriate progress indicators, and therefore, some districts 
found it impossible to estimate progress over a three-year period. 
District officials also struggled to plan for and develop goals for a three-year period because 
they were uncertain about how much money they would receive from the state over the next two 
years. One district official explained, “You don’t know how much money you’re going to get over 
the next three years. So you are stuck in the same, ‘depending on the availability of funds.’”  
Many district officials reported that completing the LCAP template was time consuming, 
particularly given the fast timeline, the fact that it was a new process, and the lack of existing models 
of what LCAPs should look like. Some district officials noted that there was a lot of preparatory 
work that had to take place before the LCAP template became available in March 2014. One 
superintendent said that she started the LCAP development process in September 2013 and 
therefore had to draft parts of the LCAP three to four times before she received the LCAP template 
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from the state. Once the template was made available, the turnaround time was ambitious. One 
district official said, “What should have taken a year, we had to do in six months.” Further, in a few 
of the case study districts, most of the drafting of the LCAP fell on one person. In one district, the 
assistant superintendent stated, “It’s a good thing I had surgery and six weeks to recover. I needed 
all that time to draft the LCAP.” Capacity to complete the LCAP was particularly an issue for some 
small districts given their limited number of central office staff. 
District officials also lamented the lack of integration of the LCAP with other existing plans 
and required reporting. One district official stated, “We have so many requirements: the LCAP, 
district plan, school plan, Title 1 Plan. [We need to] make it simpler, make [it] one single 
comprehensive plan.” A COE official recognized the need to eliminate duplication of effort: “We 
need to look at [required] elements and overlap. Let's hope that … we're not expecting districts to 
continue to duplicate, triplicate, and quadruplicate these efforts.” Respondents suggested integrating 
the LCAP with other plans and streamlining the LCAP template for small districts with limited staff.  
Some officials from basic aid or excess revenue districts also expressed frustration with the 
LCAP development process. Officials in these districts were frustrated by the amount of time they 
had to spend developing their LCAP despite the fact that their districts do not rely on state aid to 
fund public education and did not receive additional state aid under the LCFF. These district 
officials erroneously saw the LCAP as a requirement tied specifically to supplemental and 
concentration dollars, not as a new statewide requirement. Still, some district officials from these 
districts saw the value in developing the LCAP. One basic aid district that had high overall test 
scores but low test scores for EL students saw the LCAP development process as an opportunity to 
think deeper about ways to improve EL students’ achievement. 
COEs’ New Oversight Roles 
COE officials were optimistic about the potential of the LCFF and recognized the benefits 
of the LCAP development process. Though COE officials’ primary responsibility under the LCFF is 
to approve districts’ LCAPs, most COE officials offered workshops and training sessions for district 
officials and often worked individually with district officials as the new LCAP process unfolded. 
Some COE officials found that assisting district officials with developing their LCAPs and 
approving the LCAPs helped them forge relationships across departments within the COE—as 
departments had to work together to support district officials—and strengthened their relationships 
with the districts. 
COE officials experienced challenges, however, that accompanied taking on new district 
oversight and support roles without much preparation or training. Many COE officials reported 
feeling that the LCFF was a moving target. A COE superintendent said, “One of our big challenges 
was, how do we communicate when the airplane is being built while it’s in the air.” Some COE 
officials reported that they received little guidance on how to perform their new oversight role and 
would have liked to receive training from the state. One COE official explained:   
 
If county offices are going to have the oversight [role], we need training. The state’s 
position was, “You got the materials and you were supposed to be the expert.” We 
need [professional development] and assistance about what our role is. We felt like 
we were a centimeter step in front of [the districts]. 
 
Most COE officials, however, did receive support from the California County Superintendents 
Educational Services Association. The California County Superintendents Educational Services 
Association’s approval manual was particularly useful for COE officials because it detailed the 
statutory requirements for the new law and focused on developing a process for reviewing districts’ 
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LCAPs. In addition, the California County Superintendents Educational Services Association held 
trainings for COE officials and provided ongoing technical assistance for COE officials as they 
began to oversee districts’ LCAPs.  
COE officials reported that LCFF’s new oversight responsibilities have challenged their 
administrative capacity. One COE official estimated that his/her staff spent 50% of their time 
approving LCAPs. In another county, the COE official estimated that it took six hours to review a 
single LCAP, and the COE had to review a total of 19 LCAPs. In many cases, COE officials had to 
sacrifice other work—such as work on the implementation of the Common Core and Next 
Generation Science Standards—in order to oversee districts’ LCAPs. Other COEs hired new 
personnel to take on the LCFF responsibilities, which created additional challenges as these staff had 
to learn about both the LCFF and the districts the COE served. COE officials serving small districts 
had to take on a greater role in some instances when the small districts had limited central office 
staff and/or felt overwhelmed by the LCAP development process.  
Because the state is currently developing new rubrics that the COEs will use to evaluate 
district LCAPs and identify districts that are in need of assistance, COE officials worry that these 
rubrics will require that COE officials more closely review districts’ LCAPs before approving them 
and that the review process will take even more time than it did during the first year of LCFF 
implementation. As such, COE officials questioned their ability to continue do this work without 
additional resources from the state. As one COE official stated, “We’re running on fumes.” 
Community Engagement 
The majority of interviewees welcomed the new community engagement requirement of the 
LCFF. District officials reported that they worked hard to engage their local communities and took 
the process seriously because they believed that hearing from the community was beneficial. One 
COE associate superintendent noted, “[District officials] liked hearing from the community…there 
was actual valued added.” 
District officials engaged community members through multiple formats, including 
community meetings, public forums, and online and paper surveys. During the community 
meetings, district officials generally provided parents and other community members with 
information about the LCFF and the district’s LCAP. The majority of district officials in the study 
also solicited feedback from parents during the community meetings and through surveys and 
comment cards.  
Despite their attempts to engage their communities in district decisions, most district 
officials reported—and were even surprised—that turnout at community meetings was generally 
low, particularly for families of targeted student populations. One district official estimated that only 
4% of their students’ families either attended a community meeting or completed a survey.  
A few district officials obtained high turnout rates at community meetings by enacting 
strategies that removed barriers for community members to attend the meetings. These strategies 
included holding the meetings at multiple times—including evening and weekend times—providing 
transportation to and from the meeting site, and offering food and childcare. Districts that were 
successful in achieving high survey response rates attempted to make a personal connection with 
stakeholders. For example, in one district with a high percentage of parents who were illiterate 
and/or did not speak English, parent coordinators helped parents fill out the surveys. In another 
district, recruited volunteers interacted one on one with at least 10 people in their immediate circles 
to talk through the online surveys. Finally, some districts increased community engagement by 
employing external organizations (e.g., Building Healthy Communities, WestEd, Ed Trust West) to 
convene community meetings and/or facilitate with the community engagement process in general. 
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For example, in one district, an outside organization trained parents to facilitate the parent 
information sessions; district officials believed that having parents lead the sessions fostered greater 
parent involvement and more genuine conversations.  
Many COE and district officials noted that many districts did not have the capacity or the 
skillset necessary to engage their communities. Even when district officials were successful in 
achieving higher rates of turnout, district officials reported that the more affluent parents were 
typically the ones who showed up to the meetings and completed the surveys. A school board 
member remarked, “The schools with the highest parent involvement had the lowest unduplicated 
counts [of targeted students]. Parents at the poorest schools have two and three jobs.” 
With a short timeline to complete the LCAPs, most district officials spent their efforts 
attempting to engage parents and other community members, and teachers and their unions were 
frequently left out of the process. Union respondents remarked that teachers’ voices frequently went 
unheard. Similarly, school administrators were not systematically engaged in the district decision-
making. As one COE official stated, “We had school administrators who were not a part of the 
process until [the LCAP] was crafted, unless a meeting was held at their school.” Another COE 
deputy superintendent stated, “Principals were left out of this process the most because there just 
wasn’t the time. When it comes to implementing the plan, the principals are going to say, ‘We didn’t 
agree to this.’” In contrast, smaller districts were more likely to set aside time to gather teacher and 
principal input.  
Beyond gathering stakeholder input, district officials also struggled to figure out how best to 
engage stakeholders in complex educational and/or budgetary decisions. Some district officials 
stated that parents were not well equipped to give feedback on curricular matters. One director of 
special education stated, “[Parents] don’t understand what’s going on in the classroom, so to ask 
them to provide feedback, they don’t even get it. [We] are asking them to provide feedback on 
something that no one is an expert on.” As such, some district officials were uncertain of which 
issues to present to the public for stakeholder input. Across the study districts, there was variation in 
which decisions were presented to the community. Some district officials solicited input on 
budgetary decisions and/or district goals, while others asked for feedback only on an almost-
complete LCAP. Very few case study districts asked for stakeholder feedback on both district goals 
and budgetary decisions.  
District officials were also challenged to determine district-wide priorities when stakeholders 
had differing and sometimes competing priorities. For example, one district official remarked that in 
his/her particular district, creating district-wide priorities was challenging because “Schools in the 
north [were] low-income, and schools in the south [were] high-income; in the north, the emphasis 
was on basic skills and in the south, it was on extended learning.” District officials also remarked 
that it was difficult for parents to think beyond their child’s needs and consider the needs of an 
entire district.  
These challenges were exacerbated by the short time frame that district officials had to 
engage their communities. District officials explained that they had to develop their budgets long 
before they began the process of engaging the community, which led to distrust among community 
members who felt that all decisions had already been made by the time the community was involved. 
In addition, one district official noted that the community engagement process happened before the 
district received achievement data, which meant that districts were talking to community members 
with incomplete information about students’ needs. District officials stressed that with more time, 
they could have engaged more stakeholders and better incorporated stakeholder feedback into 
district decisions. 
Overall, there was variation in whether community engagement efforts led to changes in 
districts’ budgets and LCAPs. Some district officials did what they were already going to do and then 
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got “consensus” from parents. For example, one chief academic officer remarked, “Most [districts] 
took their existing strategic action plans, their existing goals, and went out and framed it as, ‘These 
are the things we’re doing, is there anything else?’ And then they got consensus.” In these districts, 
parents were frustrated that they dedicated so many hours yet felt that the district staff did not 
actually incorporate their ideas into the LCAP. Alternatively, a few district officials did incorporate 
the community’s recommendations into their LCAP. In one district, the community was concerned 
about the loss of instructional time for students who were suspended and expelled, and the district 
created progress indicators around reducing suspension and expulsion rates.  
Engaging the community in a way that led to significant changes in district decisions proved 
to be challenging for many district officials. District officials often reflected on their attempts to 
engage their communities and identified what they would do differently the following year, such as 
engage families sooner or engage a more representative sample of community members. Still, district 
officials continued to struggle with what to do with community input.  
Discussion 
This study provides a snapshot of how district and county office of education (COE) 
officials navigated their new roles and responsibilities during the first year of implementation of the 
Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF). At the time of data collection, districts were just beginning 
to make adjustments to how they created their budgets and engaged their local communities. In 
general, respondents wanted more time to adjust to the new system before the state made any 
substantial changes to the law.  
Yet the LCFF is a moving target. Since the data were collected in the fall of 2014, the State 
Board of Education revised the Local Control Accountability Plan (LCAP) template (Association of 
California School Administrators, 2014), and districts used the new template to submit their annual 
LCAP revisions in the spring of 2015. The state is also developing rubrics that the COEs will use to 
evaluate district LCAPs and identify districts that are in need of assistance (State Board of 
Education, 2015).14 The state is currently developing a new statewide accountability system that will 
integrate districts’ LCAPs, the evaluation rubric that COEs will use to evaluate districts’ LCAPs, and 
the state’s new academic standards and assessments (State Board of Education, 2015).  
Whether the LCFF will achieve its intended purposes is yet to be determined. One premise 
of the LCFF is to provide more resources to districts that serve low-income, English learner (EL), 
and foster youth students (Office of Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2013). Districts serving larger 
proportions of these targeted student subgroups receive additional state aid under the LCFF, but it 
is currently unclear to what extent targeted students are benefiting from additional state aid. District 
officials are required by law to “increase or improve services” for targeted students (California 
Education Code, 2013a). On the basis of districts’ LCAPs, however, we could not determine exactly 
how district officials allocated resources or to what extent district officials planned to increase or 
improve services for targeted students. Further, the LCFF funding weights for targeted students fall 
short of what some researchers estimate is needed for targeted students to achieve desired student 
outcomes (Duncombe & Yinger, 2004; Levin et al., 2013).  
A second premise of the LCFF is to give district officials increased flexibility in how to 
allocate state funds to best meet local needs and ultimately improve student outcomes (Office of 
Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., 2013). District and COE officials liked their increased fiscal 
flexibility and believed that it may result in more efficient spending. Most respondents believed that 
                                                 
14 The final version of the evaluation rubric is due in October 2016 (State Board of Education, 2015).  
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the LCFF was a vast improvement over California’s former school finance system. Some advocacy 
groups, on the other hand, believed that supplemental and concentration funds should be spent only 
on the targeted student subgroups; for example, the California Endowment (2014) worried that 
“Without clearer regulations, funds intended to help close the achievement gap will simply roll into 
more general school funding streams and will fail to support high-needs kids” (para. 31). More 
research is needed to determine if district officials are allocating state funds efficiently and equitably. 
At this point in time, researchers cannot determine exactly how district officials allocated resources 
using either districts’ LCAPs or the state’s current accounting system, which now combines newly 
flexible dollars including supplemental and concentration funds in the broad unrestricted funds 
category. 
A third premise of the LCFF is to move toward a system where stakeholders have an 
increased role in holding districts accountable for achieving the goals and outcomes that districts 
articulate with community input. Districts in our study generally lacked the skills necessary to engage 
their local communities in authentic decision-making on complex educational issues. In particular, 
districts needed more support in reaching families of low-income, EL, and foster youth students and 
in facilitating collaboration among different groups so that district goals were representative of 
stakeholders’ opinions. Prior research points to the difficulty of achieving meaningful and sustained 
community involvement in education (Gold et al., 2007; Hess, 1999; Malen, 1994; Meyer, 2009), 
particularly in districts serving people with low civic engagement (Noguera, 2004). More research is 
needed to determine how to support district officials in engaging their communities in a meaningful 
way. More research is also needed to understand the implications of shifting district oversight from 
the state to the COE level. COE officials reported that they needed additional supports to oversee 
districts’ LCAPs.  
Despite the challenges and uncertainties resulting from the first year of the LCFF 
implementation, we view the LCFF as many respondents did, with cautious optimism. The LCFF 
appears to be a dramatic improvement of California’s former education finance system. Districts 
serving greater proportions of targeted students receive increased state aid. District officials have 
increased fiscal flexibility to make decisions based on local needs and fewer spending restrictions 
due to state categorical funding requirements. District officials were also working to involve their 
local communities in district decisions. However, we know from prior studies on local control 
reforms that a change in a governance structure in and of itself is likely insufficient to dramatically 
improve student outcomes (Elmore, 1993; Malen, 2011; Meyer, 2009). We found that district 
officials had varying levels of capacity to perform their responsibilities under the LCFF, and we 
believe that the responsibility of improving student outcomes still largely depends on the capacities 
of district officials and their local communities.  
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Appendix  
Interview Protocols 
Interview Protocol for District Stakeholders 
1. Background 
a. What was the general financial condition of the district prior to the implementation 
of the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF)? 
b. How significant a change is the state’s new funding (supplemental and concentration 
grants) at this point? How significant will it be at full LCFF implementation? 
c. Please describe the budget and local control accountability plan (LCAP) 
development process in the district? 
d. How were you involved in the LCAP and/or budget development process? 
e. How did the LCAP change your budget development process this year? 
2. Supports/Rollout 
a. What information or supports were provided by the California Department of 
Education? By your county office of education? 
b. Did other individuals/organizations provide information or support (e.g., School 
Services)? 
3. Process, Parent Engagement 
a. How were parents and community members involved in the LCAP development 
process? 
b. What challenges did you face in engaging parents? 
c. Who served on the parent/English learner advisory committees? How were they 
selected?  
d. How did you analyze parent input to incorporate it into your LCAP? 
e. Did the information you gathered as a result of parent engagement cause you to 
make decisions you might not otherwise have made? If yes, give an example. 
f. Were any final decisions about the LCAP contested? By whom? How did you 
reconcile the disagreement? 
4. Process, Educator Engagement 
a. How were teachers and school level administrators involved in LCAP development? 
b. How was the union involved? 
c. As a result of the LCFF, do schools have added budget flexibility? How? 
5. Priorities 
a. Among the state’s eight priorities, which are most important to your district? Why? 
b. Which priorities are the most challenging to address? 
c. Did the state’s eight priorities fit well with existing local priorities or did they cause a 
shift in local focus? 
6. Budget 
a. What activities in the LCAP are being budgeted for the first time? Any new 
initiatives or supports?  
b. Did you use some dollars to restore programs that had been cut? 
c. Are teacher salaries increasing this year? 
d. Is your approach to English learner students changing? How? Low-income students? 
Foster youth? 
e. Does your LCAP or budget focus at all on early childhood education? How? 
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7. Budget, Technical 
a. Are you tracking the LCFF supplemental and concentration funds separately in some 
way (versus treating everything as one big pot)? 
b. Are you tracking expenditures on programs or items for which there are no longer 
specific state standardized account codes? 
8. General, Wrap Up 
a. Do you think the new funding formula will help you serve students better? Do you 
anticipate better outcomes? 
b. Anything else you would like us to know? 
County Office of Education (COE) Interview Protocol 
1. Districts’ Budgeting and LCAP Development Processes 
a. How were you involved with the budgeting process in the districts you support? Did 
you review district LCAPs? 
b. Did the COE provide supports to districts in the budgeting or LCAP development 
process? 
i. Were representatives from the districts you support brought together for 
training or discussion? 
c. For the districts your county serves, what is the range of the LCFF’s impact?  
d. How many districts have increasing versus flat budgets? If increasing, by how much? 
e. How did the budgeting process vary by district? 
i. In broad strokes, how similar or different were the districts’ approaches to 
developing LCAPs and thinking through how to allocate new dollars? 
ii. What contextual factors drove the differences? 
f. Districts may have various ways of setting goals, tracking progress, and developing 
district strategies. How did this year’s budgeting process differ from these other 
exercises in planning? 
i. How were they the same? 
ii. Were they redundant? 
iii. Are they aligned? 
g. What supports do districts need to work through the new budgeting process? 
h. What were some of the processes around community involvement?  
i. What were some of the best practices and challenges?  
j. Who was involved? 
i. Were all subgroups of parents involved? 
ii. Were unions involved in decisions?  If so, how? 
iii. How were teachers and school administrators involved in the process?  
2. Priorities 
a. What are the key priorities in the districts you support? Did you observe any trends? 
b. Are these priorities different than in previous years? 
3. Resource Allocation 
a. Were there any patterns in district budgetary decisions in the following areas?  
i. English learner students 
ii. Low income students 
iii. Foster youth 
iv. Early childhood education programming 
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v. Other student-need priorities 
b. In what ways were funds allocated differently this year than in years past? 
4. COE Capacity 
a. What, if any, capacity challenges do you anticipate your COE is likely to face as you 
continue to oversee districts’ LCAP work? 
b. Did you feel adequately supported by the California Department of Education to 
support districts with the LCAP development process? 
c. This year was about approving LCAPs on having met basic requirements. In the 
future, will you play more of an evaluative/assistance role? 
5. General/Wrap Up 
a. What is your opinion of the new funding formula?  
b. Are the additional resources allocated in the supplemental funds likely to meet the 
needs of the targeted populations? What improvements in outcomes for the targeted 
populations do you expect to see? 
c. What challenges has LCFF brought and what benefits? 
d. What was the process for getting your county LCAP approved by the state? Are 
there any suggestions you’d like to share for improving the process? 
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